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Criminal Law-Sufficiency of Indictments in Statutory Language
The North Carolina Constitution declares that every person charged
with a crime has the right to be informed of the accusation made against
him.' In considering this section of our Constitution, the North Carolina Supreme Court has observed that it is "an embodiment of the common law rule requiring the charge against the accused to be set out in
the indictment or warrant with sufficient certainty to identify the offense
with which he is sought to be charged, protect him from being twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense, enable him to prepare for trial, and
enable the court to proceed to judgment according to law in case of
conviction."

12

For statutory offenses, the general rule is that an indictment or
warrant charging an offense in the language of the statute is sufficient.3
Exceptions to this general rule were rare in North Carolina until recent
years. Though our court has been reluctant to require more than the
language of the statute, many cases involving this problem have been
decided by a divided court. Gradually exceptions have been engrafted
upon this general rule of pleading statutory offenses, and in three recent
cases4 the court ruled that an indictment in the language of the statute
is not sufficient.
Determining the sufficiency of an indictment in statutory language
is not a new problem in North Carolina. In a very early case the majority decided that an indictment for murder must state the length and
depth of the mortal wounds of the deceased. Even the majority expressed dislike for requiring such detail in an indictment but thought
the problem should be left to the legislature for correction. Consequently in 1811 an act8 was passed which stipulated that the charge for
a criminal offense be stated only in a plain, intelligible, and explicit
1
N. C. CoNsT. art. I, § 11 (1868) :"In all criminal prosecutions, every person
charged with crime has the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront
the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and to have counsel for defense,
and not be compelled to give self incriminating evidence, or to pay costs, jail fees,
or necessary witness fees for the defense, unless found guilty."
2 State

v. Jenkins, 238 N. C. 396, 397, 77 S.E. 2d 796, 797 (1953).
INDICTMENTS § 454 (1924); United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483
(1887) ; United States v. Simmons, 96 U. S.360 (1877) ; State v. Jackson, 218
N. C. 373, 11 S.E. 2d 149 (1940) ; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61 S.E.
61 (1908); State v. Howe, 100 N. C. 449, 5 S.E. 671 (1888); State v. Liles,
78 N. C. 496 (1878) ; State v. Stanton, 23 N. C. 424 (1841).
' State v. Cox, 244 N. C. 57, 92 S.E. 2d 413 (1956); State v.Powell, 244
N. C. 121, 92 S.E. 2d (1956); State v. Lucas, 244 N. C. 53, 92 S.E. 2d 401
(1956).
'State v. Owen, 5 N. C. 452 (1810).
'Now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-153 (1811): "Every criminal proceeding by warrant, indictment, information, or impeachment is sufficient in form for all intents
and purposes if it express the charge against the defendant in a plain, intelligible,
and explicit manner; and the same shall not be quashed, nor the judgment thereon
stayed, by reason of any informality or refinement, if in the bill of proceeding,
sufficient matter appears to enable the court to proceed to judgment."
'JoYcE,
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

manner. Our court decided cases involving sufficiency of indictments
again in 18197 and 18298 and in these decisions expressed pleasure in
not having to require the formality and detail that obtained prior to the
Act of 1811.
During the next seventy-five years the sufficiency of a number of indictments was questioned in cases in which the statutory language was
not followed, and in every case the court required strict adherence to
the statutory language.9 Undoubtedly these cases served to mold an
opinion among state law enforcement officials and members of the bar
that an indictment following statutory language would be sufficient.
However, as previously noted, exceptions to this general rule were
soon to be made and the court usually explained these exceptions by
pointing out that the statute was written in mere general or generic
terms, that the statute did not sufficiently define the crime, or that all
essential elements of the crime were not included in the statute. In
State v. Whedbee' ° an indictment for obtaining goods under false pretense was drawn in the words of the statute.'1 The court held the
indictment insufficient in that it failed to inform the defendant of the
offense charged as required by the North Carolina Constitution.' 2 In
State v. Cole' s the indictment was drawn in the language of the statute
declaring it unlawful to make a false entry in bookkeeping. 14 After reviewing the authorities concerning the general rule on indictments in
statutory language, the court held that this statute did not set forth all
essential elements of the offense and therefore an indictment in the
language of this statute is insufficient.
The court has twice considered the sufficiency of an indictment
drawn in the language of the statute making it an offense to assault a
7

State v. Cherry, 7 N. C. 7 (1819).
' State v. Johnson, 12 N. C. 360 (1827).
'State v. Mays, 132 N. C. 1020, 43 S. E. 819 (1903); State v. Bagwell, 197

N. C. 859, 12 S. E. 254 (1890) ; State v. Noblett, 47 N. C. 418 (1855) ; State v.
Hathcock, 29 N. C. 52 (1846).
10152 N. C. 770, 67 S. E. 60 (1910).
N. C. Gmx. STAT. § 14-100 (1811): "If any person shall knowingly and deN
signedly by means of any forged or counterfeited paper, in writing or in print, or
by any false token, or other false pretense whatsoever, obtain from any person
or corporation ...

with intent to cheat or defraud ...

shall be guilty of a felony

... Provided further, that it shall be sufficient in any indictment for obtaining or
attempting to obtain any such property by false pretenses to allege that the party
accused did the act with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any
particular person, and without alleging any ownership of the chattel, money, or
valuable security.....
12 For an illustration of a sufficient indictment charging violation of N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-100 see State v. Howley, 220 N. C. 113, 16 S. E. 2d 705 (1941).
13202 N. C. 592, 163 S. E. 594 (1932).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 53-129 (1921): ". . . whoever being an officer, employee,
agent, or director of a bank, makes or permits the making of a false statement or
certificate, as to a deposit, trust fund or contract, or makes or permits to be
made a false entry in a book, report, statemenf or record of such bank . . . shall
be guilty of a felony....
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person with an intent to kill and the infliction of serious injury not resulting in death. 15 In State v. Battle'6 the court explained that the
term "serious injury" used in an indictment drawn in statutory language
was too vague and indefinite. Then forty-one years later in State v.
Gregory17 the court held that it was unnecessary to describe the extent
of a serious injury in an indictment as the extent of injury became a
matter of proof upon trial and an indictment in statutory language in
this case was sufficient. Thus the latter decision removed an exception
to the general rule of indicting in statutory language.
The court held that more was required than mere statutory language
in three cases involving the "resisting arrest" statute.18 In State v.
Jenkins'9 and State v. Scott20 the warrants were drawn according to
the language of the statute, but the court refused to allow prosecution
without specific statements as to the official character of the person
alleged to have been resisted. In State v. Eason,21 although the defendant was charged in the language of the statute, the arresting officer
was not named, the official duty he was performing was not shown, and

the manner in which the defendant resisted, delayed, or obstructed arrest
was not stated. Because of the omission of these facts, the warrant was
declared insufficient and the court explained that statutory words must
be supplemented if necessary to set forth every essential element of the
offense, so as to leave no doubt in the minds of the accused and court
as to the specific offense intended to be charged.
State v.Burton2 2 presents an example of the difficulties encountered
in drafting that most frequent indictment, violation of a municipal
ordinance. The warrant charged violation of a parking meter ordinance
but failed to give the exact location of the defendant's car at the time
of the offense. In explanation, the court said that the location of the
parking meter must be stated so the defendant or his attorney can go to
the city ordinance and see if parking at that time and place constituted
23
a violation.
The North Carolina statute pertaining to offering of bribes 24 was be1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1919): "Any person who assaults another with
a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in
death, shall be guilty of a felony. .. "
-6130 N. C.655, 41 S.E. 66 (1902).
17 223 N. C.415, 27 S.E.2d 149 (1943).
11N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (1889): "Ifany person shall willfully and
unlawfully resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to
discharge a duty of his office, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
19 238 N. C.396, 77 S.E. 2d 796 (1953).
20241 N. C. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 654 (1954).
21242 N.C.59, 86 S.E. 2d 774 (1955).
22 243 N. C. 277, 90 S. E. 2d 390 (1955).
2" This would seem to require a warrant charging multiple violations of a
parking
meter ordinance to state the exact time and location of each violation.
2
'N.C.GEN. STAT. § 14-218 (1870) :"Ifany person shall offer a bribe, whether
itbe accepted or not, he shall be guilty of a felony. . ..
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fore our court in State v. Greer.2 5 -It was held that an indictment in the
language of this statute was insufficient. The court pointed out that
this statute neither defines bribery, nor sets forth its essential elements
and declared that the statutory words must be supplemented by other
allegations which would set forth the essential elements of the offense.
In State v. Lucas,2 6 the Court noted that the commission of perjury
is a basic element of the offense of subornation of perjury. Therefore,
the court held that an indictment drawn in the language of G. S. 15-146,
the subornation of perjury statute, is insufficient since the indictment
must include the matter alleged to have been falsely sworn by the
person suborned and also that the suborner knew such to be false or
was in conscious ignorance of its truth. The court said that this statute
must be read in conjunction with G. S. 15-145, the perjury statute, and
indictments drawn accordingly.
A striking example of the difficulties encountered in drafting indictments for statutory offenses is furnished by the cases dealing with
indictments under subsection 7 of our aiding and abetting prostitution
statute.27 The first six subsections of this statute described specific
ways of violations; subsection 7 is the familiar "catch all" phrase and
concludes by saying "by any means whatsoever." Even a cursory
examination of cases dealing with indictments in the language of subsection 7 of this statute reveals the oscillation of the court's views on the
matter of sufficiency. Indictments in the language of subsection 7 have
been before the North Carolina Supreme Court four times in the past
twenty-two years. In State v. Waggoner28 it was decided that the
indictment was in the language of subsection 7 and therefore sufficient.
Then in State v. Johnson29 the majority opinion declared an indictment
in the language of this subsection was sufficient to afford the accused
his constitutional rights. Thus indictments drawn in the words of subsection 7 came under the general rule of being sufficient. In the recent
case of State v. Cox3 ° the court overruled the Johnson case by declaring
that indictments drawn in the language of subjection 7 are no longer
sufficient.31 The court explained that "by any means whatsoever" can
cover a multitude of acts and therefore the warrant must charge the par25 238

N. C. 325, 77 S. E. 2d 917 (1953).
20 244 N. C. 53, 92 S. E. 2d 401 (1956).
2

N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 14-204 (1919) : "It shall be unlawful:

...

(7) to engage

in prostitution or assignation, or to aid or abet prostitution or assignation by
any means whatsover."
28 207 N. C. 306, 176 S. E. 566 (1934).
29220 N. C. 773, 18 S. E. 2d 358 (1941).
2 244 N. C. 57, 92 S. E. 2d 413 (1956).
" It should be noted that all these decisions pertained only to subsection 7 of
the statute and so an indictment in the language of the first six paragraphs presumably would be sufficient.
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ticular acts and circumstances constituting the offense. In an even more
recent case,3 2 the court reaffirmed its ruling set out in the Cox case.
From this brief review of the North Carolina cases of indictments in
statutory language it might be concluded that at least seven exceptions to
the general rule of charging an offense in the language of the statute now
exist in North Carolina. Indictments or warrants charging offenses under the statutes pertaining to false pretense, false entry in bookkeeping,
resisting arrest, offering of bribes, local ordinance on parking, subornation of perjury, and aiding and abetting prostitution have all been
declared exceptions by the North Carolina Supreme Court in recent
years. The solicitors and law enforcement officers of our state might
take note of the tendency of our court to declare exceptions to the general
rule and pay heed to the language in State v. Albarty:83
"There can be no valid trial, conviction, or punishment for a crime
without a formal and sufficient accusation. As a consequence it is
impossible to overmagnify the necessity of the rules of pleading in
criminal cases. The first rule of pleading in criminal cases is that
the indictment or other accusation must inform the court and the
accused with certainty as to the exact crime the accused is alleged
to have committed." 34
While it seems that most of the North Carolina Statutes defining or
creating criminal offenses are so worded that the statutory language is
sufficient for the indictment or warrant, exceptions do obviously exist.
Those charged with the responsibility of preparing warrants and indictments would do well to note these exceptions. 3 5
A study of the cases in which the indictment in statutory language
has been declared insufficient reveals the most common fault to be a
failure to describe the manner of circumstances under which the offense
was committed. Although a rather general one, the best test for the
drafter of an indictment for a statutory offense would seem to be:
Are the circumstances surrounding the offense and the manner
in which it was committed so specified that the defendant can
prepare for trial and, if convicted, that he could not be tried again
for this offense?
HERBERT

L. Toms,

JR.

State v. Powell, 244 N. C. 121, 92 S.E. 2d 681 (1956).
'238 N. C. 130, 76 S. E. 2d 381 (1953).
"Id. at 131, 76 S.E. 2d at 382.
"State v. Thorne, 238 N. C. 392, 395, 78 S. E. 2d 140, 141 (1953); "Scant
heed was paid to the rules of pleading in criminal cases in the preparation of the
warrant in the instant action."

